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The question is: Can we know without being conscious that we know? This is the problem 
of unconscious mentation. (Beres, 1980, p. 23) 
  
 
 
 
 
But I have had good reason for asserting that everyone possesses in his own unconscious 
an instrument with which he can interpret the utterances of the unconscious in other 
people. (Freud, 1913, p. 320) 
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Abstract 
 
 This dissertation explores the attentional processes by which the psychotherapist arrives at 
clinical inferences in his work with clients. In particular, the focus is on one of the early 
tenets of psychoanalytic technique, Freuds direction around evenly hovering 
(suspended)/free-floating attention as a vehicle for the registration of the unconscious 
material embedded in the clients communication/free association. A systematic review of 
the literature was conducted, drawing on the existing knowledge base for narratives around 
experiences of unconscious knowing by psychotherapists connected to the idea of evenly 
hovering attention. This consisted of the work of four psychoanalytic clinicians: Reik, 
Isakower, Jacobs and McLaughlin   who have built on Freud's concept, and have to that 
extent offered their own interpretation/s of how evenly hovering attention comes to occupy 
the central role within psychoanalytic practice. The intent was to bridge, make sense of, and 
interpret these different representational systems/structures in order to arrive at some 
implications to inform psychotherapy practice. The discussion underscores how the 
psychotherapists use of non-linear, undirected and associative mental processes, both 
within and outside the therapy situation, furthers the understanding of unconscious 
processes. Vignette/s from my own clinical practice and those of the four psychoanalytic 
clinicians reviewed, are included to typify the operation of these respective forms of evenly 
hovering attention.
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To the Analyzing Instrument and Beyond: 
Reconstructing Evenly Hovering Attention 
 
Introduction 
 
In this dissertation I explore Freuds recommendation that the analyst1, as he listens to the 
client free associate, place himself in a state of evenly hovering/suspended or free-floating 
attention - gleichschwebende Aufmerksamkeit 2 (Hoffer & Youngren, 2004). An old 
psychoanalytic concept, this recommendation has for some reason been the subject of little 
investigation (Calef & Weinshel, 1980). That, in itself, could qualify as reason enough for 
my choice - however, my decision had to do with my feeling that Freud was in some sense 
coming to be forgotten, dismissed as a modernist, his thinking and ideas about practice 
considered outdated, and archaic in this era of post-modernism. In my own practice, I was 
finding that the thinking and practical guidelines of older - as versus contemporary  
analysts or schools, held equal, albeit different value for the psychodynamic psychotherapy 
endeavour.  
 
The analyst who views the analysands free association as fundamental to the 
psychoanalytic situation, functions unlike the analyst who translates the patients speech 
about his life into a metaphor of his relation to the analyst in the here and now. The former, 
in his silence, allows the patient the experience of insight evolving from a self-generated 
process, the reflection upon the movements of his own unconscious (Bollas in Molino, 
1997). The latter, the interpretive analyst, promotes cure through object relationship, 
through an attitude of embrace  an approach that is exceedingly popular in present times. 
It is, however, not without its drawbacks, for lost is the opportunity that the first path 
contains for the recognition that we live in a solitary space, our understanding of ourselves 
limited, and partial at best (Bollas in Molino, 1997). That there can exist through life, a 
                                                        
1 I use the terms (psycho)analyst, (psycho)therapist, interchangeably throughout the dissertation - in that 
following Symington (2004) who writes, I hope readers will realize that some psychotherapy is in fact 
psycho-analysis and vice versa. That someone has been made a Member of a Psycho-Analytic Institute is no 
guarantee that what he does is a psycho-analysis. On the other hand someone who is a psychotherapist may be 
practising psycho-analysis (p. 1). 
2 Translated variously in English as evenly hovering, evenly suspended, or free-floating attention (German 
schweben  to float). 
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day-to-day interpretive companion/partner to our unconscious, is nothing short of an 
illusion. 
 
Old ideas then, by that characteristic alone, do not outlive their usefulness for 
psychotherapy practice. 
 
The clinical question 
  
Previously in my practice as a psychologist, I found that when in a state analogous to a 
light trance, noticing unconscious aspects of the clients material became easier. In contrast, 
purely conscious attempts to make sense cognitively, to weave intellectually, often came to 
naught. At times in my work with clients, I found myself as if adrift, where, for lack of a 
better word, I would begin to dream about things. These waking dreams (see Marcus, 
1997) were varied, sometimes an image would come to mind, at other times the snatches of 
a poem, or the tune of a song, or I would suddenly recall an experience from my own life 
with uncanny vividness. 
 
At somewhat of a loss to explain these clinical phenomena, I thought surely it could not be 
that what I had experienced was unique to me; that others had not made similar discoveries 
and struggled to understand them. And that was to be. Freud himself had known that apart 
from a more conscious attention to the client and the material being brought to the session, 
we were constantly paying attention unconsciously to the clients material,  
 
To put it in a formula: he must turn his own unconscious like a receptive organ towards 
the transmitting unconscious of the patient. He must adjust himself to the patient as a 
telephone receiver is adjusted to the transmitting microphone. Just as the receiver 
converts back into sound waves the electric oscillations in the telephone lines which 
were set up by sound waves, so the doctor's unconscious is able, from the derivatives 
of the unconscious which are communicated to him, to reconstruct the unconscious, 
which has determined the patient's free associations. (Freud, 1912, pp. 115-116) 
 
What did Freud mean by this idea of an unconscious receptive organ, and the adjustment 
that the analyst needed to make? What were the mental elements that he saw as comparable 
to sound waves and/or electric oscillations? Like any telephone device, did the analysts 
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unconscious need to dial the patients unconscious? And what if he got a busy signal or a 
wrong number? I found myself intrigued. 
 
At first glance, it appeared Freud had not enlarged on his idea. Over time however, others 
seemed to have addressed the idea albeit in somewhat different forms and language; 
conditioned daydreaming (Fliess, 1942), the psychotherapists ability to play 
(Winnicott, 1971), to be without memory and desire (W. R. Bion, 1970), to be in 
reverie (Ogden, 1996, 1997a, 1997c). While all spoke to aspects of unconscious 
knowing, what was not clear was whether these clinicians considered their concept/s as 
having directly evolved from, or containing crucial components of Freuds thinking. 
 
For some, evenly hovering attention represents but a step in the evolution of psychoanalytic 
technique (Brenner, 2000). Early on, it appeared that Freud believed in an analyst listening 
to a patient thus that the analysts unconscious understands the patients unconscious 
without conscious effort and expectation. In time, Freuds views changed, to the analyst 
listening for every aspect of a patients conflicts (Brenner, 2000, p. 548). However, no 
analyst can pay equal attention to all the material presented  there is the inevitable 
problem of selection. The moment certain material grabs the analysts attention; he loses 
contact with other parts of the clients free association. Spence (1984) notes some of the 
assumptions that have come to form part of the folklore of free-floating attention  the 
illusion of an almost mystical, garnering of the unconscious, Freuds calculus, a 
psychological X-ray which allegedly allows us to read the inside of someone elses mind 
(p. 38) - and the belief in an uncommitted, neutral observer. The danger for Spence, is that 
we forget that listening always involves subjective colourings and projections of the 
listener. 
 
Others have written of evenly hovering attention in terms of the shift in consciousness that 
the psychoanalytic setting engenders. The setting which consists of a specific ambience, 
one of timelessness, facilitates a freer expression of unconscious material (Sabbadini, 
1989). In freier Einfall3 (McDermott, 2003), the client revivifies forgotten perceptual 
residues and repressed experiences, and pockets of conflicted emotional complexes. The 
                                                        
3 What freely falls into the mind. 
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couch plays a critical role, with the analysand focusing less on objects in their surrounding, 
and more on the images that emerge in their own inner consciousness (J. M. Ross, 1999). 
Through this process, it is expected that the unconscious becomes preconscious and moves 
into the range of conscious thought.  It is the work of psychoanalysis to foster the 
conditions for a meditative atmosphere, where altering or different states of consciousness 
can be fully integrated (Badaracco, 1975). Of the mind-set/mental stance of the analyst in 
this view, Calef and Weinshel (1980) describe evenly suspended attention as an altered 
state of consciousness which favours bursts of insight (p. 285), the discovery of new 
configurations between existing elements. In the evenly suspended attentional state, the 
analyst scans the surface of his own consciousness as he scans the surface of the patients 
communication, and is surprised by glimpses, as it were, of fish among the weeds under 
the water (Brown, 1977, p. 481). If he listens passively, attention fixed less sharply on the 
client, he picks up stimuli from his own inner life, his preconscious mixing with the clients 
material (Thomson, 1980). This process results in his seeing things4 (Appel, 2000; 
Gardner cited in Poland, 1985). 
 
With these divergent interpretations of a singular idea, how does the therapist understand 
and apply Freuds evenly hovering attention? That is the subject matter of this study. 
 
Method 
 
 
This dissertation employs a modified systematic literature review, which is a 
comprehensive exhaustive search for primary studies on a focused clinical question (Pai et 
al., 2004, p. 86), with a central objective to summarize evidence on a specific clinical 
question (Pai et al., p. 87). What is modified is the evidence reviewed, being primarily 
psychoanalytic psychotherapy literature of a qualitative nature, mainly at the level of the 
traditional narrative review. 
 
Ongoing debate exists regarding use of quantitative versus qualitative methods in the case 
                                                        
4 See also Fertile eyes Les yeux fertiles (Schust-Briat, 1996). For Schust-Briat, the analyst dreams for his 
patients - in a regressive state, and attention evenly suspended, the analyst receives on his mindscreen 
images projected by the client. 
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of the systematic review methodology (Booth, 2001; Jones, 2004). The intent here is to 
conduct an interpretive rather than integrative/aggregative review/synthesis (Dixon-Woods, 
Agarwal, Young, Jones, & Sutton, 2004, 2005)5, with the goal of facilitating greater 
understanding of the clinical phenomenon under consideration (Suri, 2000). To begin, the 
research question was somewhat tentative, fuzzy, and specifying it was an iterative process 
in response to initial search results. To that extent the question served as a compass rather 
than an anchor, to guide the course of the project (Dixon-Woods et al., 2006, p. 3). 
 
The research question: 
 
How has the idea of therapists evenly hovering/free-floating attention evolved over 
the years in psychoanalytic thinking, specifically in relation to its original postulation 
as a technical recommendation by which the therapist arrives at an unconscious 
knowing of the clients material? 
 
Structure of dissertation 
 
The dissertation is divided into three main chapters, addressing three discrete epochs in 
terms of the movement and development of the concept of free-floating attention. Each 
chapter is structured around the clinical contributions of a particular psychoanalytic 
author/s who has attempted to elaborate Freuds concept and has introduced clinical 
(practice) concepts of their own to capture and encompass the same. 
 
In Chapter One, I explore Freuds original postulations around psychoanalytic technique, 
and the work of Freuds pupil, Theodor Reik, specifically his concept of the third ear. 
Chapter Two, examines the work of Otto Isakower and his seminal, but unfinished idea of 
the Analyzing Instrument. Couched in the languaging of its times, the Analyzing 
Instrument is the most direct link between Freuds technical recommendation of the evenly 
hovering attention and unconscious memory. 
                                                        
5 These authors cite this distinction between aggregative and interpretive syntheses, as first made by Noblit 
and Hare (1988). 
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Chapter Three focuses on the work of two psychoanalytic theoreticians and clinicians, 
Theodore Jacobs and James McLaughlin. Jacobs proposes the analysts access to his 
internal images as a bridge to the client, and McLaughlin amplifies and extends the idea of 
free-floating attention to outside the therapy situation, in his idea of transference 
sanctuaries where the same can continue undisturbed. The final chapter presents a 
summary of the above theorists ideas and briefly examines the implications they hold for 
the practice of psychodynamic psychotherapy, through reflection on aspects of my own 
practice.  
 
Part of the Method in the conducting of the systematic literature review is included in the 
Appendix. 
 
I have personally found it useful to hold in my mind the three main chapters as three major 
planetary bodies, in the orbits of which revolve numerous smaller and fragmentary 
satellites, that together constitute the said system. Alternatively, I have also thought of the 
dissertation as a house, with Freud and Reik forming the base/foundation of the house, 
Isakower as the central pillar, and the work of Jacobs and McLaughlin as the final roofing 
of this structure. These are images the reader may wish to bear in mind as heuristic devices 
towards an overview of the broader layout of the dissertation. 
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Chapter One: Freud and Reik   
The genesis of the idea of Unconscious Receptivity 
 
 
Sigmund Freud 
 
Psychoanalysis was born with the shift in Freuds orientation from hypnosis as a technique. 
There was now no direct revealing of unconscious material, unconscious processes would 
need to be uncovered from the content/structure of the clients free association (Rosner, 
1973). The fundamental rule asked of clients in analysis and the demands this placed on the 
analyst were quite distinct; the psycho-analyst works from the very outset with his own 
unconscious exposed, so to speak, and constantly worked upon by his patients (Zilboorg, 
1952, p. 489). 
 
Free association and free-floating attention: Heralds of a new science 
 
For reasons known and unknown, Freud came to create psychoanalysis, based on its 
fundamental tenets of the unconscious and free association. Although Zilboorg (1952) 
concluded that the method of free association was actually a maturation of a developmental 
root in the history of psychology6, Freud himself stumbled onto free association through the 
recall of a remark of Bernheims. That is, things experienced during somnambulism, 
seemingly forgotten, could be brought back into recollection. In the beginning, Freud 
appeared to insist on his patients giving him their associations, that is, until he discovered 
that this insistence was not entirely necessary, as copious ideas almost always arose in the 
patient's mind (Freud, 1923b, pp. 236-237).   
 
Freud hoped to evolve psychoanalysis as a science (Pollock, 1980), treating his 
discoveries as indifferent contributions to science  (Freud, 1914/1917, p. 15). The 
physician/analyst had two simultaneous roles, to observe and study the field, and then to 
find a way to initiate change in that field, to intervene (see Arlow, 1979). The former, by 
                                                        
6 First embarked on by Francis Galton, the English Psychologist, in what he referred to as associated ideas. 
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large, is the subject of this current dissertation. 
 
One of Freuds clearly articulated ideas about the observational situation was his 
recommendation that the analyst learn to hold  what was possibly his essential directive 
about the analysts attention, memory and desire in the analytic situation  the evenly 
suspended or free-floating attention. Freud (1912) advised, 
 
The technique. consists simply in not directing one's notice to anything in particular 
and in maintaining the same evenly-suspended attention. [The doctor] should 
withhold all conscious influences from his capacity to attend, and give himself over 
completely to his unconscious memory. (pp. 111-112) 
 
 
Thus, Freud (1912) avoids the danger that could come from the exercise of deliberate 
attention, of the doctor selecting material based on his expectations or inclinations, of 
falsifying what he perceives and finding what he knows. Freud was entering as a scientist, a 
field, that had till now had been the domain of poets and philosophers, of intuitive, 
speculative thinking, and imagination (Kris, 1950) and was painfully aware of the pressures 
on this fledgling science of his.  The rigour of scientific formulation, however, appears 
important to Freud not only as a counterbalance of sorts to the temptations afforded by 
intuition, but also in allowing him the tools needed to go about systematizing his 
observations and generating new hypotheses about his field of investigation (Kris, 1950). 
 
Having lived those lonely years, his lot of splendid isolation with this enterprise 
(Freud, 1914/1917, p. 15), Freud would have been, I conjecture, most keen to not have 
criticisms hurled his way that (scientific) objectivity was seriously and severely lacking in 
it. Thus the first aspect of his technical maxim, I learned to restrain speculative tendencies 
and, following the unforgotten advice of my master, Charcot, I looked at the same things 
again and often until they began of themselves to tell me something (Freud, 1914/1917, p. 
16). However, there was a secondary aspect to his recommendation. This may have arisen 
out of something Freud discovered in his struggle to understand some of his own neurotic 
symptoms (Davis, 1990; Kris, 1950) and dreams - He had learned the very lesson he 
spelled out to his patients in 1895: let your preconscious do the talking (Anzieu, 1986, p. 
562). In fact, as Khan (1962) hypothesizes, most likely in creating the analytic setting in the 
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way that he did, Freud was recreating something he knew worked  after all, it had in his 
own self-and dream-analysis7.  
 
It would seem that Freud came to realize that the pathway to conscious awareness of 
unconscious forces, was to abandon oneself to the unconscious, to immerse oneself in it, 
while maintaining an attitude of observance that might help one see what was happening. In 
his Interpretation of Dreams, Freud (1900) first suggests the idea of free association and by 
corollary, the idea of floating freely; asking the client to lie in a restful attitude, eyes shut8, 
attention turned to self observation, renouncing all criticism, noticing and reporting 
whatever comes into ones head, however irrelevant, unimportant or meaningless. This was 
Freud applying the fruits of his personal journey to another, and there was therefore, more 
that was required. One had to encourage the client to surrender to his unconscious, to let 
himself go (Freud, 1904, p. 251) while having the analyst join him in some way in that 
surrender. 
 
Freud always insisted that in psychoanalytic work the analyst uses his unconscious to 
decipher the patients unconscious, in other words, the ideational representatives of 
secondary repression, possibly even the inaccessible primary repression (Major & Miller, 
1981, p. 459). It would appear that as early as in his writing about the psychopathology of 
everyday life, Freud (1901) had already seized upon the mechanism between free attention 
and free association, with the relaxation of the inhibiting attention - in still plainer terms, 
as a result of this relaxation - the uninhibited stream of associations comes into action (p. 
61). 
 
Of course what followed did not appear to match what I speculate Freud held in his mind. 
The pragmatic task of attending to oneself and the other was naturally more complex than 
imagined. Fleming (1961) wrote9, the analyst is required not only to keep his own 
                                                        
7 Khan (1962) adds that in a sense then, and perhaps he did so intuitively, Freud recreated a physical and 
psychic ambience in the analytic setting which corresponds significantly to that intra-psychic state in the 
dreamer which is conducive to a 'good dream' (p. 22). 
8 A relic of the hypnotic tradition, Freud apparently dropped this emphasis very soon, as indicated in the 
footnote in Interpretation of Dreams (1900). 
9 In 1919, Ferenczi  (cited in Shapiro, 1981) writes On the one hand, [analytic therápy] requires of him [the 
doctor] the free play of association and phantasy, the full indulgence of his own unconscious On the other 
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censorship in partial abeyance, allowing for that free play between his own fantasies and 
the patients, but make certain that his reality-testing function keeps his secondary 
processes intact. The danger facing the analyst, is that if the latter were to radically 
decathect, regressive daydreaming takes over and interferes with the introspection 
necessary for understanding the patient (Fleming, 1961, p. 724). Thus, one could risk but 
attending to a single set of phenomena, be either an observer to the outer or the inner. 
Alternatively, perhaps attending to both was not deemed desirable by the early analysts 
who followed in Freuds footsteps - a function it would seem of the way they came to 
understand Freuds recommendations on countertransference. 
 
An ethical necessity 
 
It appears that the recommendations Freud made in relation to psychoanalytical praxis were 
broadly divided into two aspects, the specific technical considerations of psychoanalysis 
and the broad ethical considerations around the frame in which the therapist needs to 
operate. While there has existed the belief that for Freud the analysts feelings and 
emotional life were extra-analytic and inimical10 to the establishment of a true analytic 
endeavour, more recently, analysts have come to the studied conclusion that the latter were 
recommendations born in Freuds (1925) experience of Breuers distress when Anna O 
found herself feeling erotic longings towards Breuer (Barron & Hoffer, 1994; Tansey, 
1994). These longings Freud eventually came to understand as transference. The 
recognition of erotic feelings in himself (Blum, 1996) and in others in his circle (Tansey, 
1994) threatened Freud with the ever-present possibility that the entire science that he was 
building was precariously positioned around a precipice, a potential enactment (or the 
retreat against it, as in the case of Breuer) by the analyst of his counter-transferential 
longings for the client (Ellman, 1998). 
  
                                                                                                                                                                         
hand, the doctor must subject the material submitted by himself and the patient to a logical scrutiny, and in his 
dealings and communications may only let himself be guided exclusively by the result of this mental effort 
This constant oscillation between the free play of phantasy and critical scrutiny pre-supposes a freedom and 
uninhibited motility of psychic excitation on the doctor's part. (p. 423) 
10 Based it appears on a specific understanding of Freuds (1912) other recommendation/s,  that the 
psychoanalyst model himself on the surgeon,  putting aside all feelings in his work, and  that he is opaque to 
his patients and, like a mirror, should show them nothing but what is shown to him" (p. 118). 
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Freuds recommendation was one of indifferenz (indifference) - what came to be translated 
by Strachey as neutrality, and behaviourally, understood as abstinence (Franklin, 1990). 
Thus, in line with the monks of older times, Freud conceived that the psychoanalyst defer 
his own issues around wish-fulfilment to a higher ideal11, in this case service, and would do 
what monks of previous days have, withdraw and contemplate. Studying Freuds original 
papers on technique, Friedman (1991) attempts to understand the two roles of the analyst 
therein, as psychic archaeologist and as seducer and controller of the patients active 
wishes (p. 589), based respectively as it were on two models of what analysis was: 
memory-retrieval in the older one, and transference resolution in the new one. According to 
Friedman, Freud saw the usefulness in holding on to aspects of the memory-retrieval 
model, of balancing potential analyst activity with his passivity, stranded as it were, 
between being the one who evoked the patients wishes and the one who frustrated them. 
Thus in free-floating attention, it is also the analysts suppression within himself of any 
wish that the patient might use to settle transference longings(L. Friedman, 1991, p. 590). 
 
Freuds original maxim to the analyst, that he learn to let go of all preconceived ideas, 
simply surrendering his attention, to avoid personal control over the material (Spiegel, 
1975, p. 384) and to let knowledge of what was, emerge organically and naturally, contains 
an ethical imperative. This imperative exhorts the analyst to be wary that he not betray the 
patients (transference) love for him, that he stay steadfast to his role of helping the patient 
discover what he is applying to the person of the analyst, new editions or facsimiles of the 
impulses and phantasies which are aroused (Freud, 1905, p. 116). Freud (1915a) 
stressed that He must take care not to steer away from the transference-love, or to repulse 
it or to make it distasteful to the patient; but he must just as resolutely withhold any 
response to it (p. 166). Thus, Freud never deemed the analysts emotional unconscious 
responses as avoidable, but rather the enactment of counter-transferential longings or the 
antipathies to these longings as prohibited.  
 
In practice with clients, Freud was far from cold (S. S. Friedman, 1986), demonstrating that 
evenly suspended attention and the recognition and use of ones own emotional 
unconscious were far from incompatible. Lipton (1988) maintains that the trend in 
                                                        
11 Sublimation 
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technique, now thought of as Freudian12, classical, or standard, in actuality is post-Freud, 
that modern analytic technique suffers from an undue formalism, which is quite different 
from Freuds technique (p. 31). Lothane (2003) suggests ( tongue-in-cheek?) Freud was a 
Sullivanian, and in spite of all his theorizing never forgot the person who loves, desires, 
dreams, thinks - and suffers (p. 610) and employed the energy of love, both as eros and 
agape (p. 616). If it were but otherwise, it would be impossible to explain the loyalty and 
devotion that some of Freuds disciples had for him. One of the most ardent of these was 
Theodor Reik who proposed, of the therapist listening, not only with his two ears, but also 
with a Third Ear. 
 
Theodor Reik 
 
The reader is asked to think this over. A little known and concealed organ in the 
analyst receives and transmits the secret messages of others before he consciously 
understands them himself. (Reik, 1948/1977, p. 147) 
 
An acolyte remembers 
 
Twenty-five years after his first analysis, Reik asked Freud for help with an emotional 
issue, experiencing Freuds fine unconscious knowing, and how that is not the same as 
theoretical mastery. To Reiks self-interpretation of his clinking of coins in his pocket as 
indicative of his anal-erotic tendencies, Freud responds That is, of course nonsense. You 
think of your brothers and you are glad that you are now able to send them money (cited in 
Reik, 1948/1977, p. 258). It was this and similar experiences with Freud, that seem to have 
led Reik to the courage not to understand, to recognize that analytic expertise, lay in the 
willingness to trust the unconscious, ones own and the others, as having its rules of 
operation. 
 
Dont we ask our patients to say all that comes to mind, however stupid, silly, 
insignificant or immaterial it may appear to them? Why should we analysts not 
follow the same rule when silly thoughts occur to us? What intolerably pompous and 
conceited fools would we be, if we believed that our thought processes are different 
                                                        
12 Freud, reportedly once remarked to Reik, Moi, je ne suis pas un Freudiste (Me, I am not a Freudian) 
(Reik, 1948/1977, p. 494). 
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from those of our patients. (Reik, 1953, p. 18) 
 
For Reik, at the very centre of analysis, lies the need for an analyst to have a sense of his 
own personality, to be capable of sitting behind the patient and listening with sensitivity, 
with an awareness of his feelings, acutely attentive to his own responses. The analyst 
capable of good analysis is entirely himself, unafraid to be true to his own self, with the 
sharpest ear for what his own thoughts whisper to him (Reik, 1948/1977, p. 268). 
Following Freud, Reik (1933) wrote that the sine qua non of analytic technique is that the 
analyst approach the psychic material with a conscious openness of mind, the analyst 
behaving in his search for psychological truth as strangely as a pupil of the witch: 
Who takes no thought,  
To him knowledge comes, 
Without a care he wins it. (p. 329) 
 
 
In this context, Reik evolved what has since been expressed in other ways; none, however 
with the imagery and beauty of his simple idea - listening, with the third ear. 
 
The third ear - Listening to the unconscious 
 
For anyone who has studied the religious metaphysics of the East, a resonance with the 
Hindu idea of Shivas third eye is impossible to avoid. The opening of Shivas third eye 
symbolizes the beginning of destruction, the end of all illusion, of all duality. Was Reik 
perhaps suggesting the same, that when the third ear opens, duality dissolves, that the 
unconscious of the two is destroyed in that moment, and in the light of the spark (of 
destruction), what had been obscured is clearly seen? He writes, We have learned that 
there is a secret communication between the unconscious minds of two persons engaged in 
a conversation (Reik, 1953, p. 14). The following vignette from the work of Reik, I 
believe is indicative of the inexplicable communication that takes place between the minds 
of the psychoanalyst and his patient. 
 
A man told me a dream in which the following part appeared. I am with my father on 
board ship. My father shows me a cabin near that of the captain, I ask my father: 
Does mother know that you are leaving? He begins to cry and says, I have 
forgotten to tell her, and we decide to telephone before the ship leaves the harbor. We 
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move and we come to Lands End.  
 
There were no associations to the dream. He did not know where the name Lands End 
came from nor any ship on which he had gone with his father. Nothing occurred to him 
about the dream. Why did I ask him then and there whether he knew the play, Outward 
Bound? Do I know it? he answered astonished, I saw it in the theater and then as a 
movie and I just thought of it. That is strange. The play, which I had seen many years 
ago in Vienna, shows a ship on which the passengers are all dead without knowing it. 
The captain is God. (Reik, 1948/1977, pp. 262-263) 
 
Reik (1948/1977) deems it remarkable that the play occurs to the patient and to him. He 
speculates that it was something in the atmosphere of the dream, the symbols, the mood of 
leave-taking, the strange mixture of everyday language and something extraordinary (p. 
263); that perhaps evoked the memory of this play half-forgotten. Yet, this unwilled 
association captured what he could not have known consciously until then, that the patient 
was struggling with a superstition that, like his father who had died two years ago, he 
would soon die. 
 
Is this an example of listening with the third ear? For only by listening to ones own inner 
voices can one arrive at a deeper psychological understanding of others and of oneself. 
(Reik, 1953, p. 9). Possibly, the clients dream, its unconscious appeal, touched on some of 
Reiks own dynamics around leave-taking (Reik, 1948/1977), the death of his own father 
when he was but eighteen years (Nobus, 2006; Reik, 1953). 
 
The vignette reflects the crux of what Reik meant by listening with the third ear, an 
unconscious capacity to decipher psychological clues. It is these clues that then inspire 
psychoanalytic conjectures (Arnold, 2006). For Reik (1953), the unconscious is an area 
where both life and productivity can be seen, where there is both movement and power. 
Reik believed that the unconscious was creative (Arnold, 2007). Indeed, his ideas regarding 
the unconscious of the analyst were highly original and challenging to previous 
understandings (Nobus, 2006). 
 
Reik (1936/1999) conceived treatment, as a series of surprises.  Not only on the side of the 
patient, but the analyst too must experience surprise, compelled, as he is to operate with his 
own unconscious if he wants to reach the unconscious of his patient. Reik attributed his 
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position on technique as closer to that of Freud however, Nobus (2006) suggests that Reik 
in actuality had gone far beyond Freud, in seeing psychoanalysis as duologue between one 
unconscious and another13 (p. 693). There was no royal road to a patients unconscious; 
it was one that had to be mapped through the unconscious of the analyst. Reik suggested 
that the analyzing of a patient occurred simultaneously with the analysts self-analysis14, a 
reciprocal illumination of unconscious happenings (Reik, 1936/1999, p. 206). 
 
The third ear is a built-in system, within the unconscious, that by design understands the 
others unconscious (Arnold, 2006). Ones unconscious ends up meeting the unconscious 
of the other through a process of recurrent reflection (Reik, 1936/1999); ones mind and 
the others mind like two mirrors facing each other, reflecting each other. Meaning emerges 
as our unconscious submerges alongside the clients  the analyst who is able to allow that 
dissolution, may find his own other, his ego reclaiming that which has been repressed and 
pushed into the recesses of the mind. Reiks theory emphasizes the interface between these 
unconscious fantasies of one and those of the other. His intersubjectivity is a primal 
intersubjectivity, a dark dreamlife of interacting fantasies that rarely emerge into the light 
of consciousness (Arnold, 2006, p. 760) 
 
Reiks formulation of the third ear was unique and his understanding of the third ear pre-
emptive to much that followed in the way that unconscious emotional communication has 
come to be understood. Bucci (2001), re-framing Reiks ideas in terms of the current work 
in cognitive science, writes that the patients words along with the multiple parallel 
channels of subsymbolic expressions activate sensory and somatic experience in the 
analyst. The extent to which the analysts connections within his own emotional schemas 
are intact and operative, these expressions generate imagery, and through reflection on 
these, the analyst can infer an understanding of the patients state, a state he might not yet 
be conscious of. In other words, as the analyst embarks into his own mind and floats 
without a paddle, he comes upon the analysands. 
 
 
                                                        
13 Ferenczi, with the help of a patient, also coined the term dialogue of unconsciouses (Bass, 2001, p. 687). 
14 Grusky (1999) notes it was Reik who initially illustrated the tension between reality and fantasy, in the 
understanding of the patient through aspects of ones self-analysis, a concept further pioneered by Ogden. 
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The idea of the third ear has just about managed to survive. Nobus (2006) writes, fluctuat 
nec mergitur - it is tossed by the waves, but does not sink. Is it a coincidence that Nobus 
uses the same words for Reik that Freud himself put forth for his hope of the destiny of the 
psychoanalytic movement? (Federn, 1947). Perhaps not. In his last meeting with Freud, in 
response to Reiks obvious distress, Freud stated People need not be glued together when 
they belong together (Reik, 1948/1977, p. 493). In many ways, Freud and Reik belonged 
together; particularly in their understanding around the practice of analysis - the ear that 
listens to the unspoken is not so unlike the mind that hovers freely. 
 
Next, I delve into the work of another Vienesse psychoanalyst, Isakower and his seminal 
idea of the analyzing instrument15.  Taking up Freuds evenly hovering attention, 
Isakowers conceptualization postulates that analysis takes place in the zone between the 
unconscious of the two. It is unclear if Isakower and Reik knew each other in any sense 
other than being members of the Viennesse Psychoanalytic Society for an overlapping 
period of time (Mühlleitner & Reichmayr, 1997), yet there is a correspondence between 
their ideas. Isakower's conceptualization provides a unique amalgam of the perspectives of 
Freud and Reik  (A. Stein, 1999). 
                                                        
15 Ogden (1997b) who parallel to others, expounded the idea of the analytic third, acknowledges that 
Isakower and Lewin (who built on Isakowers work) were the pioneer explorers of the analysts use of his 
own consciousness as the analytic instrument.  
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Chapter Two: The Clinical Thinking of Otto Isakower  
The Analyzing Instrument 
 
Isakower was a major influence for several generations of analysts (Wyman & Rittenberg, 
1992). Although he published but just four papers in his lifetime; one of these, led to a 
phenomenon being named after him16. In his final paper, Isakower (1974) explores the 
theme of regressive states of consciousness in relation to creative vision. I endeavour to 
review here, what is perhaps the bounty of Isakowers lifelong interest, his concept of the 
analytic/analyzing instrument, an attempt to understand psychoanalytically the analyzing 
activity itself (Wyman & Rittenberg, 1992). 
 
The Analytic Instrument: The beginnings 
 
Isakower  (1992f) first introduced the concept of the analytic instrument on November 20th, 
195717, to clarify, the ways and means of accomplishing the goals of supervision. In an 
earlier meeting18, the curriculum committee had agreed that helping a candidate to learn 
how to listen to his patient in an analytic way, was the primary function of supervision 
(Isakower, 1992e, p. 182).  In keeping with this, Isakower submitted that Freuds idea of 
evenly hovering attention19 indicated the existence of an analytic instrument, the instrument 
or tool of the analyst, though never having quite addressed it satisfactorily. 
 
Of equal bearing for Isakower, were two other of Freuds formulations. The first regarding 
the function of Consciousness20, the second, about frame of mind of the person who is 
observing his own psychical processes21. Through this recapitulation of Freuds 
formulations, Isakower came to resolve that dilemma of the analysts dual/divided attention 
                                                        
16 Pathopsychology of phenomena associated with falling asleep (1938) - The Isakower Phenomenon. 
17 In a meeting of the Curriculum Committee, a sub-committee of the Educational Committee of New York 
Psychoanalytic Institute. 
18 November 6, 1957, the first in the series of discussions on the Problems of Supervision. 
19 The attitude which the analytical physician could most advantageously adopt is to surrender himself to his 
own unconscious mental activity, in a state of easy and partial attention to catch the drift of the patients 
unconscious with his own unconscious (Freud cited in Isakower, 1992f, p. 187). 
20 From Chapter 7: The psychology of the dream-processes, Interpretation of Dreams (1900). 
21 From Chapter 2: The method of interpreting dreams, Interpretation of Dreams (1900). 
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on self and patient. If consciousness had two surfaces, then the analyst could, at least 
theoretically, attend to the patients free associations, and to his own inner responses to 
them, how to observe himself at the same time as he observes and listens to his patient 
(Isakower, 1992e, p. 182). It is these ideas that set the frame for Isakower to launch his 
discussion of The Analytical Instrument. 
 
I do regard what I call the analytic instrument as a very concrete entity, of the character of 
reality, the highest degree of psychic reality (Isakower, 1992f, p. 193). At this early stage, 
Isakower was merely postulating the existence of this instrument. He was of the belief that 
an understanding of its nature and structure would require further study. What is clear 
however is that for Isakower the cultivation of this instrument lay at the crux of the analytic 
endeavour. A prerequisite for the development of this instrument was a candidates 
personal analysis, to deal with emotional causes that kept the instrument latent, turbid - to 
cleanse it to allow it to become more clearly conscious. The analytical instrument was at 
core a tool of the self of the analyst, a part of himself, a much greater part than a man 
would have to give for an analogous purpose in any other branch of scientific pursuit, or in 
any other branch of medicine (Isakower, 1992f, p. 193). 
 
For Isakower, cleansing continued in supervision and the elaboration of the instrument 
brought about, by making the student conscious, that he was a possessor of it; and as it 
became visible and transparent to him, inviting him to look at it, and inside it. At the core 
of the analytic instrument lay the analysts self-observation - in the context of the patients 
productions - second nature to Freud, which is perhaps why Freud himself did not elaborate 
more on the development of the analytic instrument22(Isakower, 1992f). 
 
It was six years later, that Isakower presented the revisions and elaborations of his 1957 
analytical instrument, 
 
In describing the analytic instrument, it is useful not to think of it as a permanently 
integrated, unitary system within the psychic structure of one person, the analyst. It 
seems more adequate to regard it, in its activated state, as being in rapport with its 
                                                        
22 Arlow (1969) writes, Although Freud wrote often about the process of exteroception (Pctp.Cs.) he said 
little about the so-called endopsychic observer. Perhaps he took it for granted that psychoanalysts, so fully 
involved in their own and in their patients introspection, required little instruction in this area (p. 31). 
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counterpart in the patient; or better perhaps, to see it as a composite consisting of two 
complementary halves. It will be remembered that in Freuds description both halves 
function together as one unit in continuous communication. 
 
The analyzing instrument represents a constellation of the psychic apparatus in which 
its constituent structures are tuned in a way that makes the apparatus optimally suited 
for functioning in a very specific manner. An essential characteristic is the unique and 
specific setting-in-relation to a near-identical or analogous constellation in a second 
person. It represents an ad hoc assembly for a special task and it is of a transitory 
nature. There is a certain similarity to this concept in Bleulers occasional apparatus. 
(Isakower, 1992c, p. 201) 
 
According to Isakower, the analyzing instrument worked unconsciously and when 
functioning at its best, was not subject to conscious observation. It was only in retrospect, 
that the work of the analyzing instrument, its characteristics, could be distinguished. This 
inaccessibility to simultaneous observations during its operation was a function of how the 
state in which the analyzing instrument operated was closer to a near-dream like state of 
hovering attention (Isakower, 1992c, p. 202). Only at the end of a session, when the 
patient was leaving the room, and the analyst in the process of emerging out of the analytic 
situation, awareness of the analyzing instrument could come about. At this moment, of 
the severance of the team you are left in mid-air and you become aware of the denuded 
raw surface of your half of the analyzing instrument, the surface which is opposite the 
patients half (Isakower, 1992c, p. 202). Its cathexis no longer bound to the patients half 
of the apparatus, this surface can now be observed; the analyst can begin to make 
observations as he reintegrates that part of himself within himself, that was for this duration 
glued to the patients half. 
 
Isakower indicates that what may possibly be observed at this point of recathexis are both 
visual23 and auditory/acoustic representations of the manifest content of the patients 
productions, together with the content of what came up to meet the same from within the 
analyst. It is in this mood of dreaming, a lower and quantitatively modified state of 
wakefulness in the analytic process (Isakower, 1992d, p. 207) that the analyzing 
instrument operates.  
 
                                                        
23 Freud (1923a) writes, that thinking in pictures stands nearer to unconscious processes than does thinking 
in words, and it is unquestionably older than the latter both ontogenetically and phylogenetically (p. 21). 
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Isakowers conceptualizations then are primarily about the shift of cathexis, within the 
structure of the preconscious that is required of both the analyst and analysand in the 
analytic work. Incidentally, the name changed from its origins as the analytic/analytical 
instrument, to the analyzing instrument. Perhaps this change was in line with how Isakower 
now clearly articulated that it comprised the unconscious of two, analyst-patient and not 
merely a function of the one, the analyst. 
 
An idea not remembered 
 
Not many psychoanalytic theoreticians have expressed an interest in the idea of Isakowers 
analyzing instrument. Indeed, it took some thirty years for Isakowers ideas to even be 
published (Lothane, 1993). In some sense, paradigm shifts within the psychoanalytic 
movement rendered the idea invisible, while others, perhaps equally or more interesting 
conceptualizations moved to the forefront of the analytical consciousness. Lothane (1993) 
contrasts the analyzing instrument with empathy, as a uniquely psychoanalytic concept, that 
emerges specifically in the special conditions of the analytic situation as defined by Freud; 
though it can be seen in other situations like spontaneous reverie, reading literature or 
watching a film. Kohut on the other hand, denied both free association and evenly hovering 
attention, the essential preconditions of the psychoanalytic process. To that extent, Lothane 
sees Kohut having lost the insights and intuitive knowing that come from the specific 
application of Freuds psychoanalytic method.  
 
Lothane (1993) speculates that Isakower felt somewhat inhibited in publishing his views 
about the analyzing instrument in his lifetime and in a letter to Bertram Lewin in 1970, 
Isakower with a blend of humility and self-mockery, refers to his idea as a lithopaedion, an 
ossified fetus. Either way, somehow, Isakowers analyzing instrument appears to have been 
relegated to the dusty backrooms of the mansion that Freud built. 
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The Analyzing Instrument: Further thoughts 
 
 
Clearly, Isakower wanted to build on Freuds idea of evenly hovering attention. The 
analyzing instrument is more than just an exposition about psychoanalytic observation; it is 
an idea about contact, about the specific relationship between the two in the analytic 
situation. If the original purpose of the analytic situation was to allow the client to enter a 
regressed state of dreaming; Genetically, the analytic situation is an altered hypnotic 
situation, as the analytic hour is an altered hypnotic session (Lewin, 1955, p. 169), then the 
question remains how the analyst partakes of this dream of the other? It was this question to 
which Isakower turned, when he suggested that perhaps, the only way, in a sense, was by 
being in a similar state of (un)consciousness oneself, there prevails a near-identity of the 
quality of wakefulness in both the analyst and the analysand (Isakower, 1992d, p. 207). In  
furthering the concept of the analyzing instrument, Isakower (1992d) referred to Lewins 
dream psychology, the relation between sleep and the analytic situation. 
The analysand is in a quasi dream, making accessible to consciousness memory 
traces from all parts of the psychic apparatus, even those near its topographical and 
chronological beginning. (Lewin, 1954, p. 509) 
 
 
The analyst enters a similar state of consciousness, in-between waking and sleeping, 
perhaps daydreaming  reality testing is not lost but is temporarily renounced, and the 
ego obtains, at the price of this renunciation, free access at least to the whole range of the 
preconscious psychic content (Fliess, 1942, p. 220). 
 
In some ways then, there is an intrinsically merged quality to this situation, a boundary 
permeability, a parallel sleep-like state (Klein, n.d.). Yet the analyzing instrument is 
composed of two halves, there is the separateness of each participant; otherwise, as feared, 
one would be left with two minds fused, unable to tell one apart from the other. The 
analytic situation is an enclave, where the regressive wish for fusion with the mother can be 
satisfied without a fear of ego dissolution (Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1992).  
 
Balter, Lothane and Spencer (1980) attempt to systematize Isakowers concept of the 
analyzing instrument in structural/ego-psychological terms, describing the fundamental 
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process by which the analyzing instrument becomes established, through their idea of a 
matched regression in subsystem of the ego(s) of both analyst and analysand. The peculiar 
quality of what is involved in the analysands use of free association and the analysts 
evenly-suspended attention engenders regression, and a gradual dominance of primary 
process thinking. As the sense of reality alters, ideas shift from being expressed in words to 
images, the experience becoming for both analysand and analyst more dreamlike, blurred, 
and fluid (Balter et al., 1980, p. 481). What keeps both the analysand and the analyst from 
extremes of regression is the counter force of ongoing secondary process concerns, which 
tend towards waking, and limit the regression of ego functions (Balter et al., 1980, p. 
490). Critically, Balter et al. opined that the natural disparity in the nature of these concerns 
meant that the regression of ego functions, the movement towards sleep and primary 
process, was of lower intensity in the analysts subsystem than in the analysands. 
 
The following vignette illustrates the working of the analyzing instrument24. 
 
During a particular phase in her analysis a young woman was becoming aware of 
strong phallic conflicts and a feeling of being genitally deficient. One day she told the 
following dream. She had only one breast. She was to go to the hospital the next day 
to have a breast removed. In telling the dream, she was not sure if the operation was 
depicted as already having occurred or if the remaining breast was to be removed. The 
concern about breasts had started the previous week when she was looking through a 
magazine with nude photographs of a famous movie star, now in her forties. The 
patient had been impressed with how the actresss breasts were so well preserved. The 
day before the dream she had the thought that the actresss breasts had been treated 
with silicone injections. She recalled that someone had told her that women who have 
such operations have strong masculine strivings. She then talked about her 
adolescent tom-boy phase when, although she felt quite feminine, she played with 
boys, excelled in their athletics, and depreciated other girls as silly. She felt her 
boyfriend compared her favorably with other women because of her intellectual 
proficiency, which she considered a masculine quality. She wished the analyst would 
do the same. The analyst remarked: You seem to feel I want you to be a girl who is 
also a boy. The ambiguity about the operation in the dream indicates this. The patient 
remarked that she felt her father wanted her to have been born a boy. 
 
As the idea of the mythical Amazons of ancient Greece kept coming to his mind, the 
analyst asked her if she knew about them. She answered, Yes, but could say no more 
about them. He went on to tell her that they were women who cut off one breast in 
                                                        
24 Balter, Lothane and Spencer were students of Isakower, and in addition to attending his dream seminars 
also attended a private seminar in which they were able to discuss some of the clinical implications of 
Isakowers conceptualization of the analyzing instrument. 
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order to be able to use bow and arrows, as men did. In response to this the patient 
remembered having recently complained to her mother that she (the patient) could not 
throw a ball well. To which her mother replied, somewhat humorously, that the 
patients father said it was because the breasts get in the way. The patient then had a 
visual image of Diana the Huntress, carrying bow and arrows and wearing a garment 
leaving one breast exposed. For the rest of the hour and during several succeeding 
sessions rich material from dreams and memories came to the fore, is the 
reconceptualization of regression as a two-person mutual process indicating a 
childhood fascination with the myth of Diana and Actaeon, a story which had served to 
structure the patient's infantile conflicts and defenses. (Balter et al., 1980, pp. 491- 
492) 
 
It is the setting-in-relation to each other, the two regressed25 subsystems of client and 
analyst functioning together as a unit, which allows communication and contact at the level 
of each participants fantasy-memory constellations, that lies at the crux of the analyzing 
instrument. 
 
Balter et al. (1980) posit that the analysands dream, her associations, evoked  in the analyst 
- in his analogous/near-identical state of regressed mental functioning - this rather 
idiosyncratic idea26 of the Amazons. This idea they opine, condensed for the analyst the 
two ideas of mastectomy and masculine strivings, central for this client.  Isakower (1992g) 
had suggested that what comes from the patient, ultimately comes to coincide with what is 
emerging from inside the analyst, as in a range-finder focusing device - within an area 
where visual images take part in representing a given conflict (p. 198). The analysts idea 
of the mythical amazons, converges with an important nodal image  (Reiser, 1999) for the 
client, an image connected to many experiences encoded within her memory networks. And 
such networks are organized around a core of original early memories (real or fantasied} 
[sic] of events that were cataclysmic for the child (Reiser, 1997, p. 901). 
 
The analyzing instrument is the embodiment of Freuds  hope that the beginning analyst, 
like the analysand, will be hauled along when he gets down to real inner work (Lewin, 
                                                        
25 Others have written how the analyst must be able to regress in the service of empathy and creativity (see 
Blum, 1994) and in the service of the ego (Kris, 1936, 1956), taking in affectively and understanding the 
patient in a process of a partial and controlled regression, i.e. surrendering to aspects of his psychic life, while 
maintaining his egos superior functions, assuring stability of identity, and of secondary thought (Séguin & 
Bouchard, 1996). 
26 In discussion with peers, Isakower (1992b) made clear that emergence of visual elements, while important 
in  indicating the shift of cathexis within the preconscious, was not a requirement to the adequate operation of 
the analyzing instrument. 
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1970, p. 84).  Isakower (1992d) contended that for analysis to take place the analyst needs 
to acknowledge all of his endopsychic experiences, his inner perceptions while sitting with 
a client. An image, picture/vision, or idea like in the vignette above,  a rudimentary form 
of a communicable formulation (Isakower, 1992a, p. 215), emerges in an entirely 
subjective manner from the preconscious of the analyst, without conscious intentionality.  
Sharing these with the client can effect a similar shift within the structure of the clients 
preconscious, thus facilitating the analytic work. 
 
Extending Isakowers work, Lothane (1993; 2006; 2007b) has conceived the concept 
reciprocal free association to describe the simultaneous process of imagination (Lothane, 
2007) that occurs for the analysts as he listens to the clients free associations. Here, 
Freuds two passengers in the railway compartment meet. Beyond the interaction between 
the first passenger and the passing scenery, there is also, what is taking place for the second 
passenger - and between the two. With Isakower, the subjective becomes inter-subjective; 
in these words of Lewin (1970), I believe, Freud the analyst joins with his other half, Freud 
the patient, the self-analyst and brings to life the spirit behind Isakowers conceptualization 
of the analyzing instrument. 
 
 I shall only point out that there are two sides to a train, therefore a second window 
and corresponding landscape. The passenger at the window in the original figure, 
concentrating on his side of the road, would not perceive the second window. The 
inside passenger, passively attentive to the verbal messages, would be inattentive to 
this window toobut not unaffected. He would be subject to an internal Poetzl 
phenomenon, and he would register images received from the window through the 
corner of his eye; that is, by 'indirect [peripheral] vision', which, then, he might or 
might not combine with the messages from the other passenger on the train, while they 
are traveling companions on the terminable or interminable journey. (p. 87) 
 
 
The following chapter explores the work of two psychoanalysts, Jacobs and McLaughlin, 
who are in some way constantly travelling between the two worlds, of being an analyst and 
a patient concurrently, of using ones own associations, the store of personal unconscious 
memories, fantasies and desires to understand and move closer to the client. 
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Chapter Three: Jacobs and McLaughlin 
Unconscious Subjectivity Reclaimed 
 
Theodore Jacobs and James McLaughlin are two analysts who have chosen to walk amid 
the old analytic world and the new; and have to that extent, offered some of the most 
illuminating insights, and initiated the most useful shifts. Here, I review aspects of their 
work that build on previous ideas. 
 
Theodore Jacobs 
 
Without regression on both sides of the couch there can be no analytic process and 
without attaining a state of matched regression the analyst is not in a position to receive 
the bits and pieces of fantasy, memory and imagery that arise as he listens and that give 
him access to the unconscious of his patient. (Jacobs, 1992, pp. 238-239) 
 
 
The examination of Jacobs unique contributions to the reclaiming of analyst subjectivity 
(Poland, 2000) is perhaps best started with a consideration of the substantive impact 
Isakowers thinking had on Jacobs (Bornstein, 1997). For Jacobs (1992), the analyst in 
Isakowers model strives neither to consciously or cognitively, understand the meaning of 
the patients verbalizations, nor to try and master cues or clues that might indicate how the 
patient understands his communications. The analyst functions instead at a different level 
of awareness, a more primitive one, through the establishment of a mind, a field, where he 
is able to receive the transmissions from the unconscious mind of the other. Jacobs felt that 
Isakowers concept of the analytic instrument drew much from music, its essence one of 
two musical instruments in tune in such a way that that they sound as one. As the analyst 
listens with evenly hovering attention, he unconsciously adjusts his half of the analytic 
instrument so that it resonates with its complementary part in the patient (Jacobs, 1992, p. 
239). For Jacobs then, when the analysts part of the analytic instrument is, well tuned, the 
analysts interventions will reflect his intuitive grasp of the multiple levels of meaning of 
the patients communications (cited in "Meeting of the New York Psychoanalytic 
Society," 1986, p. 374). 
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By his own self-report, Jacobs (2002), sought to expand Isakowers idea, to include as data 
not only what is received by the analyst from the verbal-auditory channel, but also from the 
visual and somatic ones - things seen and experiences registered in the body (Jacobs, 1973, 
1994). Interestingly, Jacobs notes in light of the current emphasis on intersubjectivity and 
interpersonal dimension of analysis, Isakowers exposition, almost half a century old now, 
already posited this notion of a union between the minds of analyst and patient. In the days 
when in most classical psychoanalytic institutes discussions of countertransference were 
rare (Jacobs, 1999), Isakowers notion of the analytic instrument as belonging to both 
patient and analyst, composed of a temporarily fused unconscious, was highly creative. 
 
Jacobs (1997b) contends that the discovery and rediscovery in psychoanalysis all leads 
back to a very old idea, that the minds of client and analyst can resonate in ways that allow 
for the transmission of unconscious messages between them. Freud then, laid down a 
fundamental truth, that to register such messages, to function dependably as such an 
instrument, the analyst must listen in a particular wayin an open-ended, unfocused 
manner, and with evenly hovering attention (Jacobs, 1997b, p. 1056). 
 
Taught that the analysts subjective experiences had no place in the analytic process, Jacobs 
was among those analysts in America who in the 70s and 80s began to wonder about the 
impact of the analysts personality, his history and particular sensibilities on the analytic 
hour. In divergence to the party line, writings emerged where aspects of the analysts 
subjectivity was questioned. What had been a one-person psychology focused on analytic 
objectivity for so long, began to shift into a two-person psychology (Jacobs, 1997a). To 
dreams, free associations and transference phenomena as a pathway to the unconscious, 
Jacobs (1993a) added the inner experiences of the analyst, proposing that analysts who in 
some way surrender to a certain giving over of the self, of entering into a certain creative, 
regressive state of mind, find themselves resonating to the inner life of the patient. The 
ability to understand another person depends on more than our capacity to listen to that 
individual, it hinges on listening to oneself, for the shards of memory and imagination that 
arise from within (Jacobs, 1993a, p. 14). 
 
Jacobs reconstructs his own mind at work during a single session, permitting a look within, 
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to his inner landscape, and his fluidly shifting attention between the two worlds of patient 
and analyst; capturing, as if it were, by his psychic camera, the shadows cast by the 
clients experiences in his own self-consciousness (Freedman, 1997, p. 97). Others have 
criticised the extent of attention Jacobs affords his inner world that he potentially moves 
away from listening to the mind of the patient, and from helping the patient know his own 
mind. Will Jacobss interactive analysis be sufficient to motivate this patient eventually to 
acknowledge his own inner universe instead of merely guessing at his analysts? (Green, 
1993, p. 1136). 
 
Bernstein (1999) critiques Jacobs for not thinking of the patient as a subject but as a fellow 
human being, and for not proceeding to what she sees as a symbolic position where he 
could look upon his own memories from an outside, spectator position, thus making the 
link to the unconscious undercurrents for the patient. Freedman (1997), in contrast writes of  
a continual disjunctive dialogue between Jacobs and his patient, an inner dialogue in 
which with one ear he listens to his patient, and with the other to his own inner voice (p. 
97). This however, is not without risk. As the listener gradually moves from attending to 
and partaking in the patients words and imagery, vicariously introspecting, then playing 
with his own reverie, he can suddenly be grabbed or zonked into his own subjectivity and 
the connection is broken (Freedman, 1997, pp. 97-98). Given that the images, fantasies 
and memories that arise in the analysts mind can be meaningfully related to the patients 
unconscious, the potential for deepening the experience for analyst and the client, perhaps 
more than outweighs the risks, of this endopsychic play. 
 
These critiques reflect existing tensions within psychoanalysis. Within the so-called new 
Freudians, there exist two camps, the more radical who believe that analytic theory and 
technique are in need of extensive overhaul and the more conservative who aim to build on 
established theory and practice (Jacobs, 1997a). Jacobs himself is far from a radical 
relationist27, at least in terms of where he locates himself theoretically and is critiqued by 
                                                        
27 Jacobs (1996b) points out how in describing the unnamed revolution that has occurred in psychoanalysis, 
Mitchell paints a rather dated picture of the Freudian analyst. To that extent, Jacobs sees Mitchell as having 
failed to understand and appreciate the present work of the classical analyst. Mitchell (1997) goes on to 
acknowledge, and summarily reviews the unique way in which the unbidden qualities of counter-transference 
have been used by Jacobs, as a contemporary analyst within the mainstream Freudian tradition. 
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Renik (1997) for the same28. For others Jacobs is too much of a liberal. In his defence 
Jacobs (1993b) concludes each analyst brings their own sensitivities, talents, 
cognitive/affective styles to the work, 
For reasons that I cannot easily explain, I have, as quite regular companions in my 
office, a band of revenants, friendlyand sometimes not so friendlyghosts from the 
past. They are especially fond of listening to a patients material and come alive, so to 
speak, when they hear it. I have got used to their presence and have, over time, come 
to value it. (p. 1144) 
 
Jacobs adds that it is not that way for every analyst, for some the visualisation of material 
and evocation of fantasies and memories is central (see W. D. Ross & Kapp, 1962; Simon, 
1981), for others, associations that lead to verbal connections, to the flow of thoughts and 
ideas. For Jacobs though, it is by putting himself in touch with his memories, scenes from 
his own life that he has not remembered or only dimly recalled, that helps him feel, to see 
his way into the patient's experiences, into the patients life, and his unconscious. 
 
Use of the Self 
 
It was Jacobs (1986) who introduced the term enactment to psychoanalytic lexicon (Bass, 
2003), calling attention to more subtle forms of counter-transference that operate 
camouflaged within the traditional framework of time-tested techniques. Yet, Jacobs has 
not been blind to how recent changes in the psychoanalytic thinking have propelled his idea 
of enactment to an almost mythic ideal. Feiner (2000) reports Jacobs belief that an undue 
focus on analytic interaction can become an impediment to the kind of listening that seeks 
the unconscious voice of the patient. For this, the analysts silence is required, for the 
analyst to regress and let the patients words flow over him. Perhaps that allows the patient 
and the analyst, the space for the kind of affective remembering that Jacobs sees as an 
important aspect of the analytic work. 
 
That everything essential is encompassed in the here and now of the analytic moment, 
arguably true, omits critically the recognition of the value of recovering the living past, to 
                                                        
28 Feinsilver (1999) reviews this dichotomy as seen in the work of Jacobs and Renik, as the ongoing attempt 
to bridge that long-standing gap between an intrapsychic and interactional approach/emphasis. 
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relive and be riven by (Jacobs, 2001, p. 170) fantasies and beliefs as encoded in memory. 
Like the patient who seeks to avoid the pain contained in psychological experiences locked 
away in heavily guarded memories (p. 170), for Jacobs, the analyst also avoids this 
memory, given that an awakening of the patients ghosts, inevitably touches analysts past, 
memories that he might wish left unstirred. 
 
Jacobs vision of analysis then is truly post-modern, the boundaries between the self- and 
the other- permeable in ways that perhaps defy my limited efforts to conceptualize the 
same. For Jacobs (1996c) the very activity of analyzing, keeps the channels to the 
unconscious open, to the collage-like amalgam of wishes, fantasies, affects, and 
memories (p. 316) that press-up from below and are related to the patient, but also to the 
analyst. However, Jacobs is not interested in replicating Ferenczis failed experiments in 
mutual analysis, as much as rendering a death-blow to the myth that the analyst can be part 
of a process without being transformed by it. On a more pragmatic level it is perhaps, the 
awareness for Jacobs that self-inquiry is only valid in service to the patients self, the 
patients need for healing and self-knowing, that keeps him from walking down the road 
that Ferenczi did. 
 
For Jacobs (1996a), this emphasis on the self of the analyst is not a contrived one; it is not 
as if the analyst goes into a session with the explicit intention of undertaking self analysis. 
If that were to be, then Jacobs critics would in fact be right; he has become narcissistically 
preoccupied with his own mind, his own self, at the expense of the client. Rather, Jacobs 
writes, the analyst listens by giving himself over totally to the patient, like when reading an 
absorbing novel; he comes to live in the heart and mind of his patient. It is a function of 
such immersion, that the unconscious of patient and analyst begin to resonate, the mind of 
the analyst and the mind of the client, interpenetrate. In this process what is mobilized from 
within the analyst, his affects, fantasies, memories, come to shed new meaning on aspects 
of the patients inner world. At other times it is possible that aspects of the analysts 
subjectivity that are called forth are problematic, an old issue, an old conflict. It is here that 
the analyst needs to embark on a parallel analysis so to speak, to unlock the impasse - as 
that other Jacob does with his God, this Jacobs too wrestles in the night, so that some 
illumination might be cast upon those things that live in the darkness of the psyche. 
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While the inner experiences of the analyst provide clues to unconscious material arising 
from within the patient, covert, sublevel communication and interaction occurring outside 
consciousness between the analyst and patient (Jacobs, 1997b) are also made visible in their 
wake. Here is an example, a memory that arose for Jacobs when working with a client, Mr. 
S. 
 
The memory was of my father lying in bed. I, a boy of perhaps nine or ten, approach 
him, baseball glove in hand, in an effort to get him to come to the park with me for a 
game of catch. Putting me off, he turns away, and, unhappily, I leave the room. The 
image that followed was of a patient of mine, a six-year-old girl. She is rapidly hitting 
a rubber ball attached to a wooden paddle and is counting the number of times she is 
able to do so without a miss. The third image, a fleeting one that surfaced a few 
minutes later, was of a boy sitting alone on a park bench 
 
The memory of myself and my father, I thought, was a kind of shorthand way of 
depicting the interactions that had been taking place in this hour. Sensing that I had 
pulled back from him, Mr. S. had unconsciously been trying to reach me; he had also 
been expressing anger at my withdrawal The memory referred, then, to Mr. S.s 
current efforts to reach a nonresponsive father and to my own similar efforts in 
childhood; most likely, they also reflected an unconscious recognition on my part that 
in my withdrawal I was playing out the role of that fatherhis and mine. The image of 
the young girl repeated an actual event from the previous day, when in her session this 
child displayed her prowess with a Hi Li paddle; the image referred to Mr. S.s efforts 
to gain my interest by performing for me. The fleeting image of the boy on the park 
bench was a condensation of Mr. S. and myself. At the cemetery, Mr. S. would often 
sit alone and forlorn on a bench while his father stood at the gravesite, just as I, unable 
to rouse my father, would sometimes go to the park by myself, sit on a bench at the 
ballfield, and hope to get into a pickup game. Clearly, my identification with my 
patient as a child unable to reach a father had been stimulated by the transactions of the 
hour and had evoked visual experiences meaningfully related both to what was 
transpiring between Mr. S. and myself and to each of our histories. (Jacobs, 1997b, pp. 
1054 - 1055) 
 
Jacobs (1997b) writes how such images help him reach into a realm of unconscious 
communication, a level of reception-transmission of unconscious fantasies and memories, 
that might otherwise have gone unrecognized. Nevertheless, the understanding of such 
visual and auditory phenomena that accompany the working of the analytic instrument does 
not fall in the hour itself. As with this client, discovering the meaning of these experiences 
and using them effectively takes time, reflection, and efforts to associate to the visual 
experiences that arise in the mind. 
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Thus, in his postulations around what is happening between the minds of the analyst and 
the patient, Jacobs draws heavily from what Isakower believed, 
 in sessions in which regression takes place, the two minds temporarily fuse, the 
borders between them become porous, and a continuous stream of thoughts and affects 
flows between them. (Jacobs, 2002, p. 18) 
 
Jacobs (2002) is one of few who has acknowledged the influence and debt of those who 
went before. In fact, for Jacobs the approaches of the older generation of analysts that 
tapped into the minds early imaginings need to be held in todays world. Most commonly 
Jaocbs refers to the analytic instrument, for it allows the adult mind, hidden behind layers 
of well-established defences, access to primitive thinking, to the preconscious stream of 
thought, emerging fantasies, and those early creations of the mind, condensed and 
contained in memories, that have long since been forgotten (Jacobs, 2002, p. 25). Jacobs 
hope is that through this deep remembrance of early creations of his own mind, that have 
significantly impacted his life, the patient might be able to free himself. 
 
It is no surprise then that Wyman (cited in Helm, 2000, p. 738) refers, to The Jacobs 1991 
model29 of the analyzing instrument. It would be erroneous however, to believe that 
Jacobs is but a mere interpreter and communicator of Isakowers thinking. Jacobs is one 
who has truly struggled to define what psychoanalysis was, is and can be - a meeting of 
two, who walk different, but parallel paths, and when the roads intersect, Jacobs analyst is 
unafraid to say hello, to bear witness to the clients Self, while staying attentive to the Self 
that he is. Now, that is evenly hovering attention. 
 
James McLaughlin 
 
I gradually grew accustomed to dwelling in off-hours on patient events of the day 
There was so much I had not grasped with confidence during the working day, so 
much seen only through a glass darkly. I learned to welcome these half-reflections not 
deliberately sought, and came to count on them to illuminate my later work. I 
continued to dream at times about my patients. (McLaughlin, 2005, p. 44) 
 
A contemporary of Jacobs, McLaughlins analytic work foreshadowed the arrival of the 
                                                        
29 The use of the self (Jacobs, 1991). 
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two-person, relational and intersubjective perspectives (Roughton, 2006). What makes 
McLaughlins work unique is the twist of direction regarding how McLaughlin discusses 
his musings, his daydreams outside the analytic hour, that bring to light what he had seen or 
known only dimly within it. Free-floating attention for McLaughlin moves outside the fifty-
minute hour; in the garden or in the workshop - he ponders over what is puzzling or uneasy 
left over from the day and this pondering takes him into what he calls reparative self-
enquiry (Mclaughlin, 1996, p. 227). For McLaughlin (2005) the analytic quest is a search 
for the prior experience in both analyst and client, stuff that pumps through and from the 
roots and trunks of our separate developmental pasts (p. 48)30. In this quest, McLaughlin 
becomes, as if, one with Freud. Self-analysis becomes the route to other-analysis, to 
understanding what is evoked in oneself as one sits and works with a client.  
 
In a sense, what McLaughlin does is not far from what Isakower hinted; conscious 
observation of the analyzing instrument and its operation as possible only as the apparatus 
is disassembled. The following vignette provides an insight in to McLaughlins uniqueness.  
 
In the 1970s, Mrs. P underwent analysis for help with her long-standing isolation, 
bouts of depression, and chronic inability to find satisfaction in her life. Over the first 
year of our work, I had grown weary in my effort to reach her through her incessant 
and ambiguous circumstantiality as she detailed her hopeless failures as wife and 
mother I felt stuck in my inability to help her see, and shaken in my sense of my 
own competence to see 
 
Luckily, I became aware of a mannerism unusual for me: repeatedly removing my 
bifocals during such hours to gaze blankly at the blur of my patient on the couch and to 
enjoy, for moments on end, the soft merging of color masses (flowers) on my coffee 
table. The latter gave me a sense of peaceful detachment that I was reluctant to leave in 
order to observe Mrs. P once more through corrective lens that did not help me see 
what I needed to know. Soon after, I heard an unusual intensity as I recounted to new 
friends an old story of how, when I was nine, my childhood visual impairment had 
finally been discovered of how, once behind my glasses, I sighted with delight and 
expansion a world of immense reach and clarity. 
 
Something fresh fell into place with my linking the storytelling and the ritual with my 
glasses. During my workshop reveries over subsequent weeks, a darker side to those 
                                                        
30 For McLaughlin, Isakowers conceptualization of the analyzing instrument, finds an echo. Here, the 
conjoined operation of two minds, patients and analysts, working together in a goal-specific intent to reach 
the infantile depths of the psychic reality of the one, in the course of which both may find themselves 
affirmed (McLaughlin, 1981, p. 658). 
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times drifted into focus, one I had only touched on in my previous analyses. I recalled 
what it had been like to be semiblind and not know it 
 
What I gradually came to see clearly enough was that Mrs. Ps ways of evoking my 
efforts to reach out to her, then wiping them out with repudiation and altered contexts 
had tapped into my old pain of uncertain groping and failing to know - that, moved by 
Mrs. Ps very similar distress over asserting any sureness of knowing, I had fallen into 
defensive transference behaviours of excessive assertiveness or silent withdrawal as 
ways of being rid of the burden of her/our problem. In the enigmatic ways that self-
analysis sometimes works I had come upon fresh sidestreams of familiar 
transferences. (McLaughlin, 2005, pp. 108-109) 
 
It is important to note McLaughlins rejection of the term countertransference, rather 
returning to what he sees as Freuds primal, inclusive view of transference, summarized for 
him in Loewalds 1960 statement there is neither such a thing as reality or a real 
relationship, without transference (cited in McLaughlin, 2005, p. 47). Freud, he argues, 
saw transference in a much broader perspective, but ended up selectively emphasizing an 
aspect of the same in terms of the analytic relationship. Pulling back perhaps for reasons 
strategic and personal from the affective intensities of transference and counterransference 
to a refuge and safer perspective in the distancing identity of the detached and objectifying 
(if not always accurately) physician/scientist (McLaughlin, 1981, p. 643). 
 
McLaughlins return to Freuds broader perspectives on transference and psychic reality 
facilitates a return to a relativistic view, an acknowledgement of the humanity, the 
limitations of the analyst-at-work, his essential/intrinsic participant-observer role. Thus, 
not unlike the patient, the analysts transferences also determine the psychic reality he lives 
and works in, leaving us as analysts, to deal with infinite shades and shapings in the 
perception of reality (McLaughlin, 1983, p. 171).  
 
Transference Sanctuaries 
 
It is with the shift to acknowledge the psychic reality that the analyst brings to the situation, 
that McLaughlins idea of transference sanctuaries comes about. Psychic reality is more 
than just a set of distortions of infantile beginnings; it is in fact the way that all of us, 
analyst and patient alike, perceive reality, our world, and ourselves in it (Fogel, Tyson, 
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Greenberg, McLaughlin, & Peyser, 1996).  
 
Transference sanctuaries is more than an abstract, theoretical postulation. Based in 
McLaughlins clinical experience, his unique development as a psychoanalytic practitioner, 
transference sanctuaries are an outcrop of what appears to have been McLaughlins lifelong 
wrought to balance the awareness of the analysts subjectivity, as a person, with the task 
that he is engaged in as a physician. Given McLaughlins familiarity with the Asclepian 
myth (McLaughlin, 1961) and his identification with his family doctor (Cornell, 2005; 
McLaughlin, 1993), it is plausible that in the genesis of his idea, McLaughlin drew upon 
his awareness of the Asclepian sanctuaries of ancient times, places where patients would go 
to sleep, and to incubate dreams (Whitehead, 2002). For it was through dreams that 
Asclepius healed (Halpert, 1994, p. 740). 
 
Many analysts have their favorite private haven and ritual to which they drift 
(McLaughlin, 1993, p. 378). Here, according to McLaughlin, the preconscious can hold 
sway. He refers to Calder (1980) who speaks of the laboratory of his bathroom shaving, 
the place where uninterrupted from the world, he seeks to unravel the primary data from 
dreams, memories, daydreams and symptoms, to self-analyse. Ticho (1967) speaks of other 
settings - bed, a warm bath, travel - situations that are conducive to regression, affording 
maximum opportunity for physical and mental relaxation, relative solitude (p. 311). 
Others do it differently, at the end of the day, while walking, before falling asleep, or as 
they sit on their desk (Sonnenberg, 1991). For McLaughlin (2005), the common element 
lies in the relaxation and freedom for contemplation to be found in desultory minding 
while anchored in some routine physical activity reinforced by familiar sights, sounds and 
smells (p. 114). Perhaps unconscious knowing has a chance to reveal itself in these 
sanctuaries, a continuation of what was started but could not be completed in the analytic 
hour.  
 
The roots of McLaughlins transference sanctuaries, can be traced back to his early interest 
in the states of consciousness of the analyst at work (McLaughlin, 1975). There 
McLaughlin draws a cogent picture of the analysts states of awareness, how free-hovering 
attentiveness, can extend at times to reverie, hypnogogic and hypnopompic experiences, 
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and even to dream and dreamless sleep. For McLaughlin (1991), the strain of the analytic 
situation can cause the analyst to regress from his normal working ego. To that extent, 
McLaughlin maintains a distinction between an enactment that is useful, that can be 
retrieved, and one that is not so useful, one in which perhaps the scale weighs too heavily in 
the direction of unresolved personal attributes and conditioning of the analyst. 
 
It is McLaughlin (1987) who postulates, that the analysts apperceptive looking, his 
unfocused noticing of subtle and not so subtle kinesic movements, is part of his freely 
hovering attentiveness. Perhaps the inevitable registration in consciousness of this 
incessant play of non verbal activity (p. 557), extends to the analysts attention to 
himself. I almost literally had to blind myself before I could grope for the connections 
between the plight the patient and I were in (McLaughlin, 2005, p. 110). By necessity 
then, McLaughlin (1998) relates how as analysts and therapists ones own transferential 
depths are stimulated as one comes together with the patient to form the analyzing 
instrument: 
 
The analyst must bring to the venture the asset and liability of old motivations to 
rescue, help, and heal, rooted in his own transferential past. The compromise behaviors 
and traits embodied in his work ego thus are vulnerable to fluctuation, particularly the 
liability of the analysts regression to less evolved working capacities. The analytic 
stagnation and tensions consequent to this regression embody in their detail and 
specific enactment the shared and intertwined dynamic concerns specific to both 
members of the pair. (p. 388) 
 
Enactments then are but another expression of the unconscious of the analyst, meeting the 
unconscious of the client; what cannot be known in words, or images at a point in time, 
perhaps is only able to be revealed through actional potentials and actualities, enactment is 
a form of pre-conscious thinking in action (Miller, 2007, p. 4). McLaughlin (1991) seems 
supremely aware of how paying attention to the interpersonal behaviours between the 
analyst-patient pair will eventually open doors to discovering the latent intrapsychic 
conflicts and residues of prior object relations that have gotten stirred in resonance. 
 
Inevitably then the analyst is in analysis simultaneously with the analysand, the difference 
being that by this point in his development it is hoped that there is an ease with which the 
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analyst can face the emergence of his own unconscious material - his preconscious stirrings 
(Silber, 1997) - and simultaneously use them to wonder about the clients. In physics, when 
a tuning fork of a certain frequency is set into motion, another tuning fork in its vicinity, 
with a similar latent frequency will begin to oscillate, by a process of sympathetic vibration. 
In psychotherapy, this resonance perhaps is at the level of the memories, desires and 
fantasies of the psychotherapist and the client, and at times perhaps at the level of action. 
 
 the analysts feeling and timely acknowledgement of the impact of the patient on 
him, and of the analysts impact on the patient, can evoke in both parties powerful 
resonances of those oscillations of mutual influence and confluence that were central to 
our early relating. (McLaughlin, 2005, p. 221) 
 
A readiness to experience uncertainty and unknowing, perplexity and strangeness are the 
bulwark of the psychoanalytical process, cut as it were from the same cloth, that goes into 
the making of the artist (McLaughlin, 1978). 
 
 Inside and outside of analysis, McLaughlin attempted to live his life as he wrote (see 
Arkowitz, 2006), touching the limits in every dyad (McLaughlin, 1995; see Schwaber, 
2006). As part of his psychoanalytic legacy, he left the concept of transference sanctuaries, 
sanctuaries for the soul (Greek: psukhê ), where the analysts Use of his Self, the analytic 
instrument, formed by the souls of two people analytically engaged (Silver, 2001, p. 54) 
can go-on-being. 
 
 
In their conceptualizations of Use of the Self and Transference Sanctuaries, Jacobs and 
McLaughlin take us back to Freuds original orientation around recognizing the 
unquestionable subjectivity of the analyst who is analyzing  that there is actually a 
person who is sitting behind, or in front, of that fabled couch. A person who breathes, 
feels, thinks, stumbles, and fumbles, and at the end of the day delves into his own 
unconscious processes, so that he might be able to help the client with what lies there for 
him. Subjectivity reclaimed. 
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Chapter Four: Discussion 
 
It is a very remarkable thing that the Ucs. of one human being can react upon that of 
another, without passing through the Cs. This deserves closer investigation, especially 
with a view to finding out whether preconscious activity can be excluded as playing a 
part in it; but, descriptively speaking, the fact is incontestable. (Freud, 1915b, p. 194) 
 
This dissertation attempted to explore Freuds idea of evenly hovering attention, that the 
unconscious of another can only be fathomed with the use of ones own unconscious mind. 
My question was around the evolution of this idea of Freuds and through reviewing the 
extant literature; I hoped to come to some integrated understandings that could inform my 
practice as a psychodynamically oriented psychotherapist and psychologist. 
 
My investigation was limited to those who explicitly addressed evenly hovering attention, 
and demonstrated a clear connection with Freuds unconscious knowing. I discovered that 
few had critically investigated the meaning of the idea, or its application in the work we do. 
Sifting through literature, I made the decision to focus on four clinicians whose concepts I 
believed were most directly linked to Freuds idea, and who themselves sufficiently 
articulated that connection. In places, these four clinicians also linked to each other. 
Categorically, others surveying the same literature would most likely have come to a 
different system of connecting points  but that is the inescapable problem of researcher 
subjectivity in any qualitative, interpretive research, and one I admit this research has also 
been prone to. There was a common theme across these clinicians  evenly hovering 
attention, moved out from the domain of but a technique, to the more primary subject of 
how the psychotherapist comes to know the unconscious mind. 
 
 It has become clear to me that over time evenly suspended attention has been understood in 
two broad ways. In terms of its outward form, as an even or equal, free or not fixed 
attention  a qualifier that has been in place to make certain that as therapists we do not end 
up seeing what we want to. This qualifier is common to the natural sciences, an observer 
being required to impartially note the phenomenon that he is observing in its entirety, 
without personal bias. However, it is in the second understanding, its inward form, that I 
think there occurs a purely psychoanalytic usage of the idea  its place in the unconscious 
 
 
 
 38
meeting the unconscious. The goal of psychoanalysis remains the making of the 
unconscious conscious  even though there might be disagreement on how this is 
accomplished. Herold  (1939) indicated that as analysts we will be attracted to approaches 
that fit in line with our more personal predilections. Some analysts are naturally attracted to 
a more passive, introverted approach, to studying the analysts unconscious in the analytical 
process; others, perhaps to a more active approach, analyzing the clients transference 
resistances, paying close process attention to the defensive activities in the field of the 
conscious ego (Gray, 1996, p. 88). Either path might lead to the same goal, but the former 
is what Freud propounded, at least initially, and that has been the bias of this dissertation. 
 
From the literature review, it would seem that what Freud meant when he spoke of 
oscillations received and transmitted from the unconscious, was the stream of thoughts and 
affects that in Isakowers model flows freely between two minds that merge in the 
analyzing instrument, or in the case of Reiks scheme the reciprocal exchange of 
illuminations and reflections. Another way of conceptualizing these oscillations would be 
in terms of Jacobs work, the resonance of unconscious fantasy and memory structure/s 
between the client and therapist. The following vignette from my own practice I hope will 
elucidate these various schemes, and the clinical phenomenon that has led me to pursue the 
enquiry in this dissertation. This vignette focuses on a private fantasy that arose for me 
while sitting with this client in our early work together. 
 
Mr. N, a 30-year old man, an immigrant of Asian ethnicity, first presented with 
symptoms of grief, in response to the death of an older brother. For Mr. N his brothers 
death, a sibling he had been extremely close to, almost like a twin, was emotionally 
devastating and unconsciously confirmed for him that he was destined to be alone, that 
he would lose all the people he really loved. He searched at first, rather awkwardly, to 
fill the hole left by his siblings death - unsure if he could trust coming close to anyone 
else, for fear they might leave him too. For a while, Mr. N placed his trust in a friend - 
but she happened to mistake his need for emotional intimacy for sexual desire, and that 
bothered him greatly. He felt misunderstood - and once again alone, abandoned.  
 
Session proper 
 
For some time in the session I find myself pulled to reach out and comfort him 
physically, as if in that act I might somehow thaw what appears to me to be his grief 
frozen over. Mr. N talks about the stress that he is facing at work, his experience that 
those previously thought of as friends were now out to spread malignant rumours 
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about him. His manner reminds me of a fish fallen out of her bowl, thrashing and 
gasping for a breath of air, in a medium that is not her own. I am afraid words might 
not be enough to save the fish. I too know what it is like to be an immigrant, to be a 
foreigner in a strange land. 
 
Mr. N shares that he has been waking up in the middle of the nights, with this really 
strong sense that his dead brothers touch has roused him from sleep. I wonder if this 
might have something to do with this sense that I have been feeling around touching 
him. 
 
As I grapple internally with introjected messages around touching and not-touching, 
suddenly as if out of nowhere, an image floats into my mind. Like a vision, I see a 
very young boy, lying in his mothers lap, the mother stroking him gently, repeatedly, 
across his body, lulling him as if to sleep. This closeness, this intimacy between mother 
and child stands out for me - there is a sense of oneness, and of a young child who 
implicitly trusts that he will be taken care of by mother. I wonder what this image 
represents, how did it come to arise in the way it did, to occupy my minds eye? 
 
I sense, no, I feel quite certain, that the scene condenses an unconscious transference-
countertransference dynamic between us. Mr. Ns deeply unnamed, his dissociated and 
unfelt (pre-oedipal?) wish to be nurtured, to be comforted, triggered as such by his 
brothers unexpected death - and my pull to respond to the same, in a tangible physical 
way. But, then, for a second there, the image stirred something indefinable from my 
own life, in terms of my own relationship with my mother; something about how I also 
wanted to lie in my mothers lap as a child, and have her stroke me to sleep. I am 
uncertain if the image speaks to the client, to me, or to the relationship between us. 
Who lies on that lap, who covets it more, me or Mr. N? 
 
Epilogue 
 
Many sessions later, as we talked about Mr. Ns desire to be looked after, Mr. N 
remembers what it was like for him as a child. As he lay on his mothers lap, he recalls, 
all his troubles went away, his mothers touch could stroke all his suffering away. As 
he walks out of the room, Mr. N reaches, quite naturally it seems, and touches my arm. 
I realize he is letting me know that he is beginning to feel loved again. 
 
How did I see the vision I did? Did it come up automatically; did my unconscious read his 
unconscious directly? Not likely, in fact one of the reasons that the idea of evenly hovering 
attention has been criticized is because of the suggested almost magic-like quality by which 
knowing seems to arise. In actuality, the process was far from instantaneous. There was 
something, beyond the range of my conscious attention that was being communicated to me 
 the clients unconscious mind, if I stay with Freuds telephone analogy, was dialing 
mine. To receive the transmission from the patients unconscious, and be able to convert it, 
there would need to be some echo of similar oscillations, similar unconscious derivatives 
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within me  as also a willingness to have that unconscious memory rise to consciousness. 
We can listen with the third ear, only to what is within us. 
 
With my client, I had already experienced some tracings of the analyzing instrument, in that 
hazy sense of wanting to touch him, to comfort him. These tracings it seems had been 
working silently in the background, mixing and merging at an unconscious level in my 
psyche, their synthesis and/or product eventually rising in the form of that representation, 
that fantasy that came to my mind. However, that was not only it. My own past, my own 
developmental history was also somewhere encapsulated in that waking dream that I had 
with Mr. N.  
 
When I pursue far enough my associations to my visual images, they reveal, in each 
instance and with each patient, rich likenesses in the conflicts, character, and 
circumstances, past and present, of my patient and myself, and in the tensions then at 
work between us. Often they tend to heighten or dramatize, and therefore make easier 
to explore, what earlier had been invisible, or if visible, seemingly insignificant. 
(Gardner cited in Olson, 2000, p. 394). 
 
It was not so uncanny then, that the client was sitting at the crossroads of being touched, or 
not-touched, and that equally alive were aspects of my own experience, intersecting and 
interpenetrating this theme of love, rejection, of touch freely given or touch withheld. 
Jacobs work in fact would suggest that it can be no other way. Smith (1993) writes of 
symmetries of affect and experience in our analytic work, while Aaron and Bushra (1998) 
discuss mutual regression, of patient and analyst  needing  to differentially surrender to 
one another (p. 408), to be transformed. The work with Mr. N had roused to 
consciousness memories from my own conflicted past. 
  
And what of transference-countertransference31? If I was to go with what McLaughlin 
writes, I might interpret the situation somewhat variedly, as Mr. N focusing those 
transferential needs of nurturance, of the lost brother, and mother, onto me  but also me, 
quite inadvertently, focusing some of mine on him  a transferential Venn of sorts, made 
up of mutual, and overlapping sets. What was my transferential need? Somewhere in 
                                                        
31 Lasky (2002) differentiates between  the inner states of the analyst, what he conceptualizes as the analytic 
instrument (as distinct but with commonalities with Isakowers idea) from his or her countertransference  as 
manifest behavior. 
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wanting to comfort Mr. N, in an unconscious sense, I was wanting to soothe myself, to 
pacify my own child, the one who grieved for his own lost (m)other. That was something I 
did not realize in the actual session. It was only later, in what I think of as my transference 
sanctuary, that this awareness came about. The silence of the night, its solitariness, affords 
me quiet, and walking, reading then, I have found that I reflect on my day, and on my work. 
As I mused in my transference sanctuary over this picture of a mother lulling her baby to 
sleep  I saw that embedded in the backdrop of my psyche there was yet another 
fragment, a shard of a memory, a childs lullaby from far back and the wish that 
accompanied it, that my own mother had at some point sung it to me. In that instant I had 
watched this mother stroking her child, stirred into awakening was an experience buried 
deep in my own history, of old needs unmet from a time long ago! 
 
There is, I believe, little that is inwardly different between McLaughlins sanctuary and 
mine, for as he writes there is a familiar safety of these known places and rituals, where we 
 
draw on transitional phenomena. tap into latent traces of our positive experiences 
with one or both parental figures and draw once more on their nurturing and releasing 
aspects, which had helped us find our earlier way, to gain affirmation and strength to 
face our present and assimilate our unwanted, conflictual past. (McLaughlin, 2005, p. 
115) 
 
Not coincidental then, that it is the dark Mother, the Goddess Kali, who personifies the 
night for me, and in her envelop, I find my rest. 
 
Like McLaughlin, who took the risk of journeying back to where analysis was born, in the 
crucible of Freuds self-analysis - it must be for any of us. We can only analyze, when we 
begin with I, our principal analysing device lies within ourselves (Frayn, 1996, p. 305). 
We can only walk as far with our clients, as we are willing to walk with ourselves. My 
work with Mr. N showed me that. Once again. 
 
A point from my vignette  I did not share this particular vision with Mr. N when it arose. 
However, there were other images that came up in the work, that I did. How does the 
therapist make the distinction between what image to share and what not to? How did I 
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make it? It is crucial that the therapist make judicious use of his associations32, decide what 
and how much to disclose to the patient about such spontaneous, ideas, images and 
feelings. Calef and Weinshel (1980) write how the analyst does not retransmit at once 
knowledge gleaned of the unconscious, but first translates the unconscious into secondary 
process  he might eventually make an interpretive remark, careful that he does not pre-
empt the analyzing functions of the client  thus maintaining throughout his role as the 
conscience of the analysis. As this keeper of the analytic process, the larger context for 
me then was that the vision arose early in work, and at a point when I was concerned about 
the extent of Mr. Ns decompensation. While I did not share my vision with Mr. N at the 
time, I believe holding it in my mind, an unspoken interpretation, allowed for the touch that 
followed, to come later. 
 
Evenly hovering attention, third ear, analyzing instrument, use of the self, transference 
sanctuaries - essentially speak of regression, on both sides of the couch, a shared state of 
mind that allows the derivatives of unconscious mental life to be transmitted and received. 
As therapists then we need to allow regression to happen, for our sense of self to dissolve 
enough so that when solid again, there is some of the client within us. Catching the drift of 
the patients unconscious with ones own unconscious, supposes a sort of topographical 
regression in the analysts psychic apparatus (Major, 1980, p. 397). 
  
Can one teach the therapist to thus regress, to listen analytically, with evenly hovering 
attention, to the client and himself, for these derivatives of unconscious mental functioning? 
I suspect there is a way that this can be taught, but whether through education or training, 
or whether it is something that we would learn through osmosis, through absorbing what it 
is like to sit with ones own analyst/supervisor as he or she allows himself/herself to melt33 
is unclear. Perhaps it is a function of first creating the necessary conditions to permit this 
                                                        
32 Balter et al. (1980) suggest that An analysands readiness to accept, understand, or respond to an 
intervention can be determined by different factors, one of which may be the degree to which the analyst is 
hearing the session's material at a level of regression comparable to that of the analysand and responding to 
him on that level (p. 500). 
33 Bienvenu refers to MUzans concept of Chimera, an independent being that lives within the analytic 
space and is nourished by the fusion of the analyst and the analysand's psyches in a state of deep formal 
regression; it is fed by moments of what he calls paradoxical thinking, moments when the analyst is the 
object of intruding thoughts, images, sounds, and bodily sensations, which he does not recognize as his 
property. To find a communicative value to these phenomena the analyst must be able to tolerate without 
anxiety a certain degree of depersonalization (MUzan, cited in Bienvenu, 2003, p. 412). 
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process. Following the negative injunctions or not doings (Böhm, 1999), what Langan 
(1997) calls a paradoxical willing not to will (p. 827) and then to let go and watch what 
happens, watch the fireflies as they merge and separate, as they dance into the night. Over 
time, I would suspect, attention and conscious internal perception become more regulated, 
controlled, and useful within the activity of the analyzing instrument (Balter, 1999, p. 
107). 
 
Conclusion 
 
Freud first proposed that the analyst meet the unconscious of the client with his own 
unconscious, to use his unconscious in this way as an instrument in the analysis (Freud, 
1912, p. 116)  but this knowledge became lost. Reik attempted to retrieve this knowledge, 
but while his idea took hold34, it never reached full development. The gauntlet needed to be 
passed on. It was a task that Isakower seemed well-suited for, his deep study of dreams 
seeing him through in his retracing of the early developments in Freuds thinking around 
this instrument of analysis. Connected to an older psychoanalysis, a model of mind that 
located topographically, the Unconscious, the Preconscious, and the Conscious (M. H. 
Stein, 1992), what Isakower postulated was radical35 - a conjoint operation of minds, with 
multiple points of contact/relationship at levels of unconsciousness, that accounted for how 
things unseen came to the analysts mind (Spencer & Balter, 1990). His exposition brought 
back the lost knowledge, that at the core the analytic-therapeutic setting is a dream stage 
and the communications between the analysand and analyst have their manifest and latent 
meanings and messages (Lothane, 1983, pp. 441-442). 
 
Even though Isakowers concept of the analyzing instrument did not impregnate ostensible/ 
normative psychoanalytic thinking, it lies behind much of our current paradigms, having 
been the subject of much discussion along the analytic grapevine (Wyman & Rittenberg, 
1992), analysts having long sought to understand what constitutes it (Boyer, 1989, p. 
703).  
                                                        
34 It was Reik who was Paula Heimanns first training analyst, and in whose tradition she seems to have been 
walking (Tyson, 1992) when she wrote that paradigm shifting paper on countertransference (Heimann, 1950). 
35 In retrospect, it appears the analyzing instrument was in part a reaction to the abstract and impersonal 
stance of ego psychology (Grossman, 1992). 
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Jacobs (Jacobs, Aron, & Balsam, 2001) furthered Isakowers work, seeing regression as a 
state of analytic creativity, where primary process can hold sway once again, and images 
arise like dreams for the analyst, to serve as an extension of that royal road to the 
unconscious. In a state of regressive exploration of deep structures in the mind, connecting 
to the primitive contents and processes of his own psychic life, that the analyst will find he 
meets the patient within himself(Séguin & Bouchard, 1996, p. 462). It is this meeting 
Jacobs extols as the Use of the Self. 
 
Finally, McLaughlin put forth the idea of transference sanctuaries, a place where the 
analyst can continue his dreaming. The trance like qualities of the path to symptom 
formation are best investigated in the dream-like quality of the psychoanalytic setting 
(Lothane, 1997, p. 182) - but if the trance, the dream was to continue, outside of it, the 
possibilities are endless. McLaughlin showed us that the therapists day does not end with 
his last client - to stay true to the concept of unconscious, to acknowledge that 
countertransference experiencing exists fundamentally in an unknowable region (Bollas, 
1983), means that self-analysis goes on. In the end both client and therapist are dreaming 
each other up (Bollas in Molino, 1997, p. 37), it is that short-lived interpretation  verbal 
or symbolic  that comes out of this interplay of dreaming that is inspired. 
 
For me this journey was in a sensed affinity. A debt towards Freud, scientist but also artist, 
for having mapped the first journey and the pain of seeing some of his most brilliant 
contributions fall into a state of neglect and disuse spurred my walk down this road; a wish 
to resurrect the father in a sense, internally for myself, but also externally for the broader 
psychotherapy community. I came into this country with a sense of loss, my psychotherapy 
mentor and I had finally parted ways. In some sense then this dissertation has been an 
unconscious working through of some of the pain of that ending - and an attempt to find 
new internal objects, new fathers. Of my own father - my relationship with him has been 
somewhat ambivalent - I struggled with his unmeaning but pernicious, unspoken criticism, 
his emotional unavailability as I was growing older - but there were also times when in his 
quiet manner, I felt held and understood. So the journey continues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Appendix: Method Process 
 
A systematic search of the literature was conducted in relation to my constructs of interest. 
This involved two aspects; first, the identification of the appropriate database/s, which in 
this case has been limited to Psychoanalytic Electronic Publishing (PEP), in order to keep 
the scope of my dissertation to my chosen domain of investigation, psychodynamic 
psychotherapy. I then used keywords related to my defined topic of interest to identify the 
appropriate articles, as listed in Table 1.1. 
 
Table 1.1: PEP 1 
 Search Terms 
(words or phrases) 
PEP Limits: Search within Results 
evenly suspended attention Article 306 
 Para 279 
evenly suspended attention  Article or Para 265 
 Quote 22 
 Reference 2 
free floating attention Article or Para 376 
free floating attention Quote 25 
 Quote 15 
free floating attention AND 
therapist 
Article or Para 160 
evenly hovering attention Article 293 
 Para 269 
evenly hovering attention Article or Para 251 
evenly hovering attention Quote 9 
 Dialog 3 
 Reference 4 
freely hovering attention Article 169 
 Para 38 
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 Quote 3 
 Dialog 2 
analysts associations Article or Para 60 
 Quote 9 
analysts free association Article 5 
analysts fantasy Article or Para 30 
 Reference 4 
analysts primary process Article or Para 3 
 
 
I read the abstracts of all hits resulting from search parameters to identify if the article held 
relevance to my topic. All articles thus selected comprised my initial pool and each of these 
article abstracts and summaries was then subject to a second reading, in order to arrive at a 
more circumscribed pool of relevant literature.  
 
During this latter process, what became apparent was that while there were numerous hits 
relating to evenly suspended attention, few examined the concept itself. Furthermore, 
scanning through this mass of literature revealed the existence of conceptual schemes that 
seemed to be developmental offshoots of evenly suspended attention. Three main schemes 
emerged, Theodor Reik and his idea of the Third Ear, Otto Isakower and his idea of the 
Analyzing Instrument, and post-modern Freudians Jacobs and McLaughlin and their ideas 
of Use of the Self and Transference Sanctuaries respectively. I then carried out systematic 
searches within each of these schemes. Table 1.2 lists these searches. 
 
Table 1.2: PEP 2 
Search Terms 
(words or phrases) 
PEP Limits: Search within Results 
theodor reik Author 11 
third ear Article or Para 124 
reik And third ear Article 91 
reik And third ear Article or Para 63 
Isakower Author 4 
Isakower Quote 17 
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analyzing instrument Article or Para 127 
 Quote 6 
 Reference 58 
isakower And analyzing 
instrument 
Article 79 
 Reference 29 
isakower And analytic 
instrument 
Article 138 
isakower analytic instrument Para 45 
isakower analytic 
instrument 
Article 38 
 Para 26 
isakower analysing 
instrument 
Article 19 
 Para 10 
 Reference 4 
analysts preconscious Article or Para 36 
theodore jacobs Author 44 
jacobs And use of the self Article 37 
jacobs use of the self Para 19 
james mclaughlin Author 41 
transference sanctuaries Article 16 
mclaughlin self analysis Para 13 
 Reference 45 
 
 
Some articles were sourced through a basic search by key name/s under the subject heading 
of Psychology and Psychotherapy of multisearch - an AUT University Library federated 
search engine application for searching across multiple electronic resources/databases from 
a single interface, and subsequently sorting through the relevant clustered results. Table 1.3 
lists these searches.  
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Table 1.3: Multisearch 
Search term Cluster (topic/category) Results 
Reik Journal abstract 
Listening, Psychoanalysis 
Other 
7 
7 
42 
Isakower Instrument 
Other 
20 
25 
Theodore Jacobs Theodore Jacobs 
Analytic Process 
Some Reflections 
Other 
16 
6 
6 
59 
James McLaughlin Reviews the book 
Transference 
Other 
12 
7 
79 
 
 
In addition, I hand searched the reference list/s of the resultant article base for other articles 
of primary relevance, which at times included a new search in PEP by authors to identify 
further relevant literature. Lastly, I initiated a request to the curator of The Archives of The 
New York Psychoanalytic Society and Institute, Nellie Thompson, PhD, for access to 
relevant portions of the original society minutes in which Dr. Otto Isakower first postulated 
his idea of the Analyzing Instrument and discussed both the mechanisms and 
implications of the same with other training analysts of the society. Dr. Nellie Thompson 
kindly arranged for access to the same in the form of an archived journal publication, a 
compilation of these discussions. 
 
Exclusion of literature 
 
In the second process of identifying relevant articles, I excluded those not explicitly 
focussing on the technique of free-floating/evenly suspended attention or any of its 
developments. Particular theorists formed part of my exclusion criteria, such as Wilfred 
Bion and Thomas Ogden. My reason for this has been twofold. Firstly, the work of both 
Ogden and Bion have of recent been extensively reviewed (Russell, 2005; Solomon, 2004, 
2006) and second, my intent has been to limit my investigation to those whose work 
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broadly falls within the Classical Freudian tradition, and to its most direct outgrowth in 
terms of Ego Psychology, and the neo-Freudians. To that extent, I have chosen to exclude 
those whose contributions can be seen as lying within the distinct psychoanalytic traditions 
of Melanie Klein, Kohut and his Self Psychology, its outgrowth Intersubjectivity, and 
Jacques Lacan. Bion was analyzed by Klein (F. Bion, 1995) and belonged to the Kleinian 
end of the split in British Psychoanalysis (Coltart in Molino, 1997). Ogden does not appear 
to explicitly think of himself as a Neo-Kleinian, yet some of Ogdens central theoretical 
premises appear based in a reworking of the Kleinian tradition and could be considered as 
having intersubjectivised Klein (Haumann, 2004, p. 63). 
 
Ethics 
 
The focus in the research is on the psychotherapists experience of his own mind when 
working with a client, his internal/fantasy life, and aspects of his subjectivity, i.e. 
memories, reminiscences and personal associations. Any clinical illustrations used are 
primarily about my inner experience in relationship to my client/s, what was evoked in me 
as I attempted to be with another. Written consent has been sought from the clients 
involved. Identifying details including names have not been used in the research. If 
necessary, descriptions have been changed to protect client anonymity. Participation was 
voluntary. Those who agreed to take part were free to withdraw from the study at any time 
up until the completion of data collection. There were no costs or financial benefits for 
clients taking part in this study.  
